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EXAMINING AN UNDERDEVELOPED
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD: TRIAL IN
ABSENTIA AND THE RELINQUISHMENT
OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT
TO BE PRESENT
*

EUGENE L. SHAPIRO

The right of a criminal defendant to be present at trial has been
characterized by the Supreme Court as “one of the most basic rights”
guaranteed by the Constitution, and yet the Court has only intermittently
discussed the constitutional standard for assessing its relinquishment.
Both federal and state courts now perceive that the constitutional standard
only requires a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, and they
frequently focus upon the issue of the voluntariness of a defendant’s
absence. A large number of the federal circuits have supplemented this
constitutional standard with a non-constitutional, supervisory
requirement that a trial court balance the individual and governmental
interests involved before proceeding with trial in absentia. This approach
has not commended itself to a majority of the state courts which have
considered it.
This article discusses the evolution of relinquishment analysis in the
Supreme Court and the development in the federal courts of this nonconstitutional, prudential methodology. It then concludes that there is a
need to refine the constitutional standard for assessing a potential
relinquishment of the right to be present, so that both the individual and
societal interests involved are more adequately accommodated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In light of the central position occupied in our adversarial system by
1
a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to be present at trial, the
intermittent attention paid by the Supreme Court to the relinquishment
of the right is striking. The slow pace of doctrinal evolution in the area
would seem, in part, to be the product of several factors. The case
which has emerged as the Court’s most influential statement on the
2
right, Diaz v. United States, was decided in 1912. It directly recognized
the validity of a relinquishment of the right by a defendant who
voluntarily absented himself from trial, observing that such absence
3
“operates as a waiver of his right to be present.” The next century was
marked by two significant developments. One reduced the frequency of
judicial challenges alleging the right’s abridgement in federal cases, and
the other injected uncertainty into the determination of the proper
analysis for assessing a relinquishment of the right.
In 1944, Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
reflected the above-stated conclusion of Diaz while, at the same time,
delineating the circumstances under which a defendant’s voluntary
4
absence from trial “shall be considered” a waiver. Thereafter, federal
courts most frequently focused upon the reach of the federal rule, often
rendering a constitutional discussion unnecessary or at times seemingly
peripheral. A second important post-Diaz development, which posed
fundamental doctrinal questions concerning the relinquishment of a
defendant’s right to be present, occurred in 1970. The Supreme Court’s
significant, if predictable, conclusion in Illinois v. Allen—that a
disruptive defendant may relinquish his or her right to be present at
trial—employed an approach that appeared to reflect a concept
involving the defendant’s forfeiture of the right, rather than traditional
5
waiver analysis. There was an emphasis in Allen upon the importance
6
of the state’s interests, and this characteristic of the opinion will be
discussed below.
1. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992).
2. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
3. Id. at 455.
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee notes n.1–3 (1944). Rule 43 was rephrased,
effective December 1, 2011, retaining the consequence that the right to be present is waived
by a defendant who is voluntarily absent from trial. See infra note 96 and accompanying text
(discussing the current text).
5. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346–47 (1970).
6. Id.
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In 1972, the Court briefly appeared to be poised to closely scrutinize
the relinquishment of the constitutional right to be present at trial when
7
it granted certiorari in Tacon v. Arizona to consider questions that the
Court characterized as involving “constitutional limits on the States’
authority to try in absentia a person who has voluntarily left the State
8
and is unable, for financial reasons, to return.” While serving in the
Army in Arizona, defendant Tacon had been charged with a state felony
9
for the sale of marijuana. After he was discharged from the service and
went to New York, he asserted that he lacked the funds to return to
10
Arizona for trial. The trial proceeded in his absence, as authorized by
state law, and Tacon was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of
11
five to five and a half years. Certiorari was granted to consider four
questions: whether a felony defendant can be tried “completely in
absentia”; whether a felony defendant can “be held to have voluntarily
waived his right to be present at his trial without a hearing” and express
findings on the issue; whether a felony defendant can “be deprived of
[the] right . . . because he is too impoverished to afford travel expenses
to the site of the trial”; and whether Arizona had “establish[ed] a
12
knowing and intelligent waiver . . . in [the] case.”
In February of 1973, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of
13
certiorari as “improvidently granted.” It concluded that “these broad
questions were not raised by the petitioner below nor passed upon by
the Arizona Supreme Court. . . . The only related issue actually raised
below was whether petitioner’s conduct amounted to a knowing and
14
intelligent waiver of his right to be present at trial.”
The Court
concluded that this was “primarily a factual issue which [did] not, by
15
itself, justify the exercise of [its] certiorari jurisdiction.” In dissent,
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated that
the Arizona Supreme Court’s consideration of whether the defendant
had validly waived “his right to confrontation and to be present at the

7. Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 351–52 (1973).
8. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 351.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 351–52.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351 (1973) (No. 71-6060).
13. Tacon, 410 U.S. at 352.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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17

trial of his case” raised a sufficient issue to warrant review. Focusing
most extensively upon the former right, the dissenters found no showing
18
of a valid waiver. With the Court’s dismissal of certiorari in Tacon so
soon after its opinion in Allen, uncertainty concerning the impact of
Allen upon the proper approach to a defendant’s relinquishment of the
right to be present remained.
Part II of this article will discuss the development of the Supreme
Court’s waiver analysis in assessing the relinquishment of the
constitutional right to be present at trial, noting the contexts within
which the issue has been addressed. Part III will describe the
development in the federal courts of a non-constitutional methodology
supplementing their implementation of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which was enacted to embody the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Diaz v. United States. More specifically, it will be
observed that this supervisory and prudential approach, which in
addition to considering a defendant’s waiver also balances the state and
personal interests involved, appeared to develop in part as a reflection
of the Supreme Court’s methodology in Illinois v. Allen. In conclusion,
Part IV will argue that appropriate federal constitutional relinquishment
analysis should include both the issue of a defendant’s voluntary waiver
and a structured consideration of interests similar to some of those now
examined in the prevalent non-constitutional federal approach
supplementing Rule 43.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S SIGNPOSTS ON RELINQUISHMENT: DIAZ,
TAYLOR, ALLEN, AND CROSBY
As previously noted, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the
constitutional requirements for a criminal defendant’s relinquishment of
the right to be present has not always followed a linear course of
development. This Part will demonstrate that the Court’s most
consistent relinquishment analysis has focused upon the approach to a
defendant’s waiver of the right that was employed in Diaz v. United
19
States. As will be discussed below, in the 1970 Supreme Court Case
Illinois v. Allen, a potential alternative approach appeared, employing a
kind of forfeiture inquiry that highlighted the interests of the State as
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 353 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 355.
Id. at 354–55.
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912).
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20

well as those of the defendant.
Over the years, however, Allen’s
methodology has not developed further as an alternative constitutional
relinquishment approach, and the Court’s reaffirmations of Diaz’s
waiver analysis have created significant confusion in lower courts.
Diaz involved a defendant who, while on bail, had voluntarily
absented himself from portions of his non-capital homicide trial in the
21
Philippines. Diaz had expressly consented to the continuation of those
22
portions of the trial with his counsel’s participation. Following his
conviction and unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, he argued that he had not voluntarily waived his right to be
present, that the right was not waivable, and that the trial court had
23
lacked the power to proceed.
The case presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
assess the application of the congressional enactments that governed the
matter in the Philippines, and to address the prevailing policies
concerning the relinquishment of the right to be present. As did Diaz’s
24
objections, the Court focused squarely upon the issue of waiver. In
doing so, the Court addressed the question of
whether the provision in § 5 of the Philippine Civil Government
Act, securing to the accused in all criminal prosecutions “the
right to be heard by himself and counsel,” makes his presence
indispensable at every stage of the trial, or invests him with a
right which he is always free to assert but which he also may
25
waive by his voluntary act.
Noting that the provision’s “substantial equivalent is embodied in
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of United States” and in state

20. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); see also Sarah Podmaniczky, Order in the
Court: Decorum, Rambunctious Defendants, and the Right to Be Present at Trial, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1283 (2012) (discussing forfeiture of the right to be present at trial and arguing that
courts should consider the fairness of the proceedings, not the etiquette and decorum of the
courtroom).
21. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 444–45. Those portions of the trial involved the examination and
cross-examination of two government witnesses. Id. at 453.
22. Id. at 445.
23. Id. at 453.
24. Id. at 453–56.
25. Id. at 454. In addition to providing individual rights for Filipinos, this federal
enactment established the governmental structure in the Philippines during the American
colonial term. See Donald M. Seekins, Historical Setting, in PHILIPPINES: A COUNTRY
STUDY 1, 28 (Ronald E. Dolan ed., 4th ed. 1993).
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constitutions, the Court observed, “It is the right which these
constitutional provisions secure to persons accused of crime in this
country that was carried to the Philippines by the congressional
27
enactment.”
Consequently, the Court found that “the prevailing
course of discussion here may and should be accepted as determinative
28
of the nature and measure of the right there.” The Court then stated
that, in the case of a non-capital felony and when the accused is not in
29
custody,
the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in
his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify
what has been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but,
on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present
and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner
30
and with like effect as if he were present.
The Court’s conclusion rested upon strong considerations of public
policy, which echo to this day in the judicial consideration of voluntary
absence during trial. Quoting an earlier view of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia with clear approval, the Court noted that it
was not “consonant with the dictates of common sense” to permit a
defendant on bail “whenever he pleased, to withdraw himself from the
31
courts of his country and to break up a trial already commenced.” The
result of such a practice, “if allowed to be law, would be to prevent any
trial whatever until the accused person himself should be pleased to
32
permit it.”
In 1973, in Taylor v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the policy in
Diaz, noting that it was the very voluntariness of a defendant’s absence

26. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 454–55. The reference to an embodiment of a “right to be heard”
in the Sixth Amendment, id. at 454, bears a strong resemblance to the Court’s later discussion
in 1934 in Snyder v. Massachusetts of the Due Process Clause’s “opportunity to defend,”
which there provided a basis for the right to be present, 291 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1934).
27. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Court noted that “with like accord [authorities] have regarded an accused
who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the
right.” Id. The first barrier existed “because his presence or absence is not within his own
control” and the second because the defendant “is deemed to suffer the constraint naturally
incident to an apprehension of the awful penalty that would follow conviction.” Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 457 (quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1899)).
32. Id. (quoting Falk, 15 App. D.C. at 454).
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during trial that implicated Diaz’s concerns. It expressly rejected the
defendant’s argument that the refined waiver requirements of Johnson
34
v. Zerbst mandated that it be demonstrated that an absent defendant
“knew or had been expressly warned by the trial court” that he had a
right to be present, that the trial would continue in his absence, and that
35
absence would foreclose his right to testify and confront witnesses.
Johnson v. Zerbst had required that an effective waiver of the right to
counsel at trial required an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment
36
of [the] known right or privilege.” In Taylor, the Court responded that
it was “wholly incredible” to suggest that the defendant, who had
attended the beginning of trial and was free on bail, “entertained any
37
doubts” about his right to be present. The Court added,
It seems equally incredible to us, as it did to the Court of
Appeals, “that a defendant who flees from a courtroom in the
midst of a trial—where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are
present and ready to continue—would not know that as a
38
consequence the trial could continue in his absence.”
While Taylor elaborated upon Diaz’s waiver discussion only three
years after Illinois v. Allen was decided, it did little to undermine the
strong possibility that Allen’s quite different approach, discussed more
fully below, might provide a separate path of analysis. To the contrary,
in Taylor the Court approvingly quoted from Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in Allen, which had emphasized the state’s interest in
proceeding: “As was recently noted, ‘there can be no doubt whatever
that the governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be
defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going
39
forward.’”
A brief observation concerning the simultaneous evolution of the
Supreme Court’s view of the constitutional source of the right to be
present is appropriate. In the 1934 Supreme Court case Snyder v.
40
Massachusetts, Justice Cardozo, speaking for the court, was prepared to
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18–19 (1973).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Taylor, 414 U.S. at 19.
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
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state that a defendant’s right to be present was encompassed within the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, for “[i]t bears, or
may fairly be assumed to bear, a relation, reasonably substantial, to his
41
opportunity to defend.” The defendant, Snyder, on trial for murder
and attempted robbery, had been denied permission to accompany the
42
jury, the judge, and counsel to the scene of the crime. Citing its due
process methodology of recognizing principles of justice “so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
43
fundamental,” the Court viewed the scope of the right to be present in
this narrow methodological context, stating that “[s]o far as the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a
condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would
44
be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” In Snyder, the
Court concluded that the defendant’s presence at a view of the crime
scene was not assured by the privilege to be present, as “[t]here is
nothing he could do if he were there, and almost nothing he could
45
gain.”
Citing Diaz, Justice Cardozo observed that the right to be
46
present might be lost by “consent or at times even by misconduct,” and
cautioned that “[c]onfusion will result . . . if the privilege of presence be
identified with the privilege of confrontation, which is limited to the
47
stages of the trial when there are witnesses to be questioned.” While
“due process of law in a fair adversary process” continues to occupy a
48
central position as a source of the defendant’s right to be present, the
Court has since embraced the notion that both the Due Process Clauses
and the Confrontation Clause “guarantee to a criminal defendant . . .
the ‘right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might

41. Id. at 106.
42. Id. at 103.
43. Id. at 105 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106, 111–12 (1908)).
44. Id. at 107–08.
45. Id. at 108. The Court added that the risk of an undetected erroneous viewing was
“so remote that it dwindles to the vanishing point.” Id. Snyder’s inquiry into the function
served by a proceeding alleged to be within the right to be present continues to be important.
See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745–47 (1987) (concluding that the questions asked of
child witnesses at competency hearing and the potential role of defendant at that hearing did
not implicate the right); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1985) (finding that a
conference concerning impartiality of juror did not involve the right of the defendant to
personally attend).
46. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106.
47. Id. at 107.
48. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975).
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49

frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.’”
Snyder’s contemplation of a defendant’s loss of the right to be
present by misconduct foreshadowed the central issue of relinquishment
50
in Illinois v. Allen in 1970. In Allen, Justice Black’s opinion for the
Court began with an observation that “[o]ne of the most basic of the
rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to
51
be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.” The Court then
framed the question before it as “whether an accused can claim the
benefit of this constitutional right to remain in the courtroom while at
the same time he engages in speech and conduct which is so noisy,
disorderly, and disruptive that it is exceedingly difficult or wholly
52
impossible to carry on the trial.”
Allen had been excluded from the courtroom at his robbery trial
after extraordinarily abusive behavior and repeated warnings by the
53
trial judge. His request to represent himself had initially been granted,
and an attorney was appointed by the court to “sit in and protect the
54
During jury selection, Allen again abusively and
record.”
disrespectfully argued with the judge about the scope of his questions,
55
and the court asked standby counsel to proceed with jury selection.
Allen continued to talk, stating that the attorney was not going to serve
as his lawyer, and “terminated his remarks by saying, ‘When I go out for
lunchtime, you’re [the judge] going to be a corpse here.’ At that point
he tore the file which his attorney had and threw the papers on the
56
floor.” Allen was warned that another such outbreak would result in
57
his removal, but the warning “had no effect.” His abusive remarks
continued, he was removed from the courtroom, and the jury was
58
selected in his absence.
After a noon recess and before the jury returned, Allen was
permitted to return to the courtroom, where he complained about the
49. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 n.15
(1975)); see also Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (1985).
50. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 346.
54. Id. at 339.
55. Id. at 339–40.
56. Id. at 340.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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procedure and his attorney. He asked to be present at trial and was
told by the judge that he would be permitted to remain “if he ‘behaved
60
[himself] and [did] not interfere with the introduction of the case.’”
When the jury returned, his attorney moved to exclude the witnesses
61
from the courtroom. Allen objected by stating, “There is going to be
no proceeding. I’m going to start talking and I’m going to keep on
talking all through the trial. There’s not going to be no trial like this. I
62
want my sister and my friends here in court to testify for me.” Allen
was again removed from the courtroom, and, except for his appearance
for identification purposes, he remained out of the courtroom during the
63
presentation of the State’s case. During one of these identification
appearances, he “responded to one of the judge’s questions with vile
64
and abusive language.” After the presentation of the State’s case, the
judge reaffirmed his promise to Allen that he could return to the
65
courtroom if he agreed to conduct himself properly. After giving such
assurances, Allen was permitted to return for the remainder of the
66
67
trial. It was then conducted by his standby counsel.
68
Allen’s conviction was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme Court
69
denied certiorari. In a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus,
Allen then alleged that he had been deprived of his constitutional right
70
to remain present throughout the trial. While the district court found
71
72
no constitutional violation,
the court of appeals disagreed.
Addressing the issue of waiver, it stated:
A relinquishment of rights by waiver that is compelled by an
election of choices is involuntary and not a waiver at all. The
choice given the petitioner in the instant case by the trial judge,

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Allen, 226 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1967).
Allen v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 339.
United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 233 (7th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 235.
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either to behave or be expelled from the courtroom, compelled
the petitioner to involuntarily “waive” a constitutional right. No
conditions may be imposed on the absolute right of a criminal
defendant to be present at all stages of the proceeding. The
insistence of a defendant that he exercise this right under
unreasonable conditions does not amount to a waiver. Such
conditions, if insisted upon, should and must be dealt with in a
73
manner that does not compel the relinquishment of his right.
The Court of Appeals added that “[t]he proper course for the trial
judge was to have restrained the defendant by whatever means
necessary, even if those means included his being shackled and
74
gagged.”
The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of Allen from the
courtroom constituted a permissible measure for the trial judge to have
75
taken. The Court explained its holding as follows:
Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against the loss of constitutional rights . . . we
explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be
present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he
will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial
76
cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.
The Court added that the right to be present may be reclaimed when
77
the defendant is willing to conduct himself appropriately. It stated that
“[i]t is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that
dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in
78
our country,” observing that the accused may not be “permitted by his
disruptive conduct indefinitely to avoid being tried on the charges
79
brought against him.” In his separate concurrence, Justice Brennan

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 347.
76. Id. at 343 (citation omitted). The Court also discussed permissible actions such as
binding and gagging a disruptive defendant or citing him or her for contempt, noting the
constitutional availability of these measures and their disadvantages. Id. at 343–44.
77. Id. at 343.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 346.
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emphasized that “[c]onstitutional power to bring an accused to trial is
fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social
80
justice and peace.”
More than thirty years ago, Professor Peter Westen explored the
distinction between the waiver of a defendant’s constitutional defense
81
and its forfeiture. Traditional waiver analysis involved the “rigorous”
test of whether the relinquishment of a right was “knowing, intelligent,
82
and voluntary.” Professor Westen continued,
In other words, before the state could permanently prevent a
defendant from asserting constitutional defenses, it had to show
that he made a deliberate decision to forgo these defenses, that
he made the decision after being fully apprised of the
consequences and alternatives, and that the state itself had done
nothing to make a decision to assert his rights more “costly” than
83
a decision to relinquish them.
The relinquishment of a constitutional right, however, may also
84
occur through a process of forfeiture. “Unlike waiver, forfeiture occurs
85
by operation of law without regard to the defendant’s state of mind.”
A defendant can forfeit constitutional defenses “without ever having
made a deliberate, informed decision to relinquish them, and without
ever having been in a position to make a cost-free decision to assert
86
them.” Focusing upon the forfeiture of defenses by pleas of guilty and
rules of timing, Professor Westen concluded,
In sum, the analysis of forfeiture in criminal procedure is no
different from the analysis of constitutional rights in other
contexts: it requires one to identify the nature of the defendant’s
interests, to identify the nature and magnitude of the state’s
interest, and to strike a balance between the two in light of

80. Id. at 347 (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
82. Id. at 1214. Professor Westen described the formulation in Johnson v. Zerbst as
“classic”: “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.” Id. at 1214 n.1 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
83. Id. at 1214.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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While Professor Westen’s analysis focused upon forfeiture in these
specific areas, the then-recent analysis in Illinois v. Allen did not go
88
unnoticed. He found that the “real” basis for the decision was that
the defendant “forfeited” his right to be present by his
misconduct: that is, even though the defendant continued in his
desire to remain in the courtroom, his constitutional right to be
present was outweighed by the state’s overriding interest in
89
being able to proceed with the trial in an orderly fashion.
He added that Professor Yale Kamisar had expressed a similar view
90
of Allen in an unpublished memorandum in 1972. This view of Illinois
v. Allen—that the non-waiving defendant’s interest in one of his “most
91
basic” rights was weighed against the State’s obviously paramount
interest—is inescapable from the Allen opinion itself. The broader
methodological question that Allen raised was the extent to which this
interest-balancing forfeiture analysis might more generally provide an
alternative to traditional waiver standards in assessing a potential
relinquishment of the constitutional right to be present.
Allen’s forfeiture approach has received scant attention from legal
92
commentators. In a rare commentary on the matter, one treatise does
briefly express the view that, in assessing the consequences of a
defendant’s voluntary absence, forfeiture analysis “would seem
93
preferable.”
It is now apparent, however, that Allen’s forfeiture
analysis has simply failed to materialize as an independent alternative
constitutional inquiry. It has nevertheless provided the backdrop for the
development of a non-constitutional balancing-of-interests approach in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, supplementing their implementation of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. This development will be
87. Id. at 1239. Professor Westen made this observation in the context of discussing
forfeiture by guilty plea. Id. He reached a similar conclusion with regard to forfeiture
analysis and rules of timing. See id. at 1254.
88. Id. at 1239 n.50.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
92. Instead, discussion of relinquishment is customarily confined to waiver analysis
alone. See, e.g., JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 21:2 (3d
ed. 1996); 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 721
(3d ed. 2004).
93. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.2(d) (3d ed. 2007).
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discussed in Part III.
The continuing vitality of the Court’s constitutional waiver rationale
was most recently reflected in Crosby v. United States, which did not
address the defendant’s constitutional claim but still had much to say in
94
reaffirming the significance of the 1912 Diaz opinion.
Crosby
presented the issue of whether Rule 43 permitted the trial in absentia of
95
a defendant who is voluntarily absent at the beginning of trial. As
considered by the Court in Crosby, Rule 43 provided, in part,
(a) PRESENCE REQUIRED. The defendant shall be present at
the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict,
and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided
by this rule.
(b) CONTINUED PRESENCE NOT REQUIRED. The further
progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict
shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to
have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant,
initially present,
(1) is voluntarily
96
commenced . . . .

absent

after

the

trial

has

94. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1993).
95. Id. at 256.
96. Id. at 258 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (1990)). Since December 1, 2011, Rule 43
states:
(a) When Required. Unless this rule, Rule 5, or Rule 10 provides otherwise,
the defendant must be present at:
(1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea;
(2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the
verdict; and
(3) sentencing. . . .
...
(c) Waiving Continued Presence.
(1) In General. A defendant who was initially present at trial, or who
had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, waives the right to be present
under the following circumstances:
(A) when the defendant is voluntarily absent after the trial
has begun, regardless of whether the court informed the
defendant of an obligation to remain during trial;
(B) in a noncapital case, when the defendant is voluntarily
absent during sentencing; or
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In that case, Crosby had fled before jury selection at his trial with
97
others for mail fraud. After a fruitless search and several days of delay,
the trial court found his absence to be “knowing and deliberate,” adding
that “requiring the Government to try Crosby separately from his
codefendants would present extreme difficulty for the Government,
98
witnesses, counsel, and the court.” The Court stated that “Crosby
voluntarily had waived his constitutional right to be present during the
trial, and that the public interest . . . outweighed his interest in being
99
present during the proceedings.” Consequently, Crosby was tried in
100
absentia and was convicted, along with two of his codefendants.
On appeal, Crosby argued that Rule 43 precluded the trial in
101
absentia of a defendant who is absent at the commencement of trial.
While the Court of Appeals rejected this claim, the Supreme Court
102
reversed. The Court unanimously found that “[t]he language, history,
and logic of Rule 43 support a straightforward interpretation that
prohibits the trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the
103
beginning of trial.” With regard to the language and structure of the
Rule’s limit upon those situations in which a trial may proceed, the
104
Court noted that the Rule “could not be more clear.”
In response to the Government’s request for the Court to seek
guidance from an examination of the law at the time of the Rule’s
adoption in 1944, the Court concluded that such history did not support
105
the Government’s position. It took the occasion to comment upon the

(C) when the court warns the defendant that it will remove
the defendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, but
the defendant persists in conduct that justifies removal from the
courtroom.
(2) Waiver’s Effect. If the defendant waives the right to be present,
the trial may proceed to completion, including the verdict’s return and
sentencing, during the defendant’s absence.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
97. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 256.
98. Id. at 257.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 262.
103. Id.; see Gerald G. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience of the
Guillotine?: Video Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 63, 97–99 (2002).
104. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 259.
105. Id.
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context of Diaz, which had manifested a policy “that was codified
106
eventually in Rule 43(b).” The Court noted that “at common law the
personal presence of the defendant [was] essential to a valid trial and
107
At felony trials, the right was
conviction on a charge of felony.”
generally considered unwaivable and was premised on the notion that
fairness required that the jurors meet the defendant face-to-face and
108
that witnesses testify in his presence. Quoting an 1851 Pennsylvania
opinion, the Court added, “It was thought ‘contrary to the dictates of
humanity to let a prisoner “waive that advantage which a view of his sad
plight might give him by inclining the hearts of the jurors to listen to his
109
defence with indulgence.”’”
Diaz, which involved a defendant who had “absented himself
voluntarily . . . from his ongoing trial,” had authorized “a limited
110
exception” which was later incorporated into Rule 43(b).
Diaz’s
policy against permitting a defendant to defeat proceedings “after trial
has been commenced in his presence” was reflected in the comments of
111
the Advisory Committee that drafted Rule 43, and the Court found
“no reason to believe that the drafters intended the Rule to go
112
further.” It noted, “[W]e do not find the distinction between pretrial
and midtrial flight so farfetched as to convince us that Rule 43 cannot
113
mean what it says.” The Court specifically noted that it expressed no
opinion on “[w]hether or not the right constitutionally may be waived in
114
other circumstances,”
and, since Crosby’s Rule 43 claim was
115
dispositive, the Court did not address his constitutional objection.

106. Id. at 259–60.
107. Id. at 259 (quoting WM. L. CLARK, JR. & WILLIAM E. MIKELL, HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 492 (2d ed. 1918)).
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 178 (4th ed.
1895) (quoting Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103, 104 (1851))).
110. Id. at 259–60.
111. Id. at 260; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee notes n.2 (1944).
112. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 260.
113. Id. at 261.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 262. For an argument that Rule 43 should be revised to embody a “public
necessity” requirement reflecting an interest in proceeding, see Lucas Tassara, Trial in
Absentia: Rescuing the “Public Necessity” Requirement to Proceed with a Trial in the
Defendant’s Absence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 153, 170 (2009).
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III. FEDERAL NON-CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGY
SUPPLEMENTING RULE 43
A. The Approach Among the Circuits
Just two years after Allen, federal Courts of Appeal began to
develop a non-constitutional methodology, supplementing Rule 43 and
incorporating a balancing-of-interests analysis. The Second Circuit’s
116
opinion in United States v. Tortora has provided the foundational basis
for this prudential, supervisory doctrine, sometimes referred to as a
117
“complex of issues” analysis, that examines a trial court’s exercise of
118
discretion when deciding to proceed to trial under Rule 43(b). While
Tortora’s approach has been significantly augmented in the Second
119
Circuit by United States v. Nichols, the Tortora–Nichols approach has
by now commended itself to most of the federal circuits.
120
Tortora involved a trial of five defendants for loansharking.
Defendant Samuel Santoro jumped bail and was absent throughout
121
trial.
After having to accommodate the disparate schedules of the
attorneys and the previous absences of two other defendants, the trial
judge concluded that since Santoro had voluntarily and knowingly
122
absented himself his trial would proceed without him.
Santoro and
123
John Tortora were convicted. Citing Diaz, the Second Circuit found
that a defendant’s absence could waive his right to be present under
both Rule 43 and the Constitution, if the absence occurred before jury
124
selection. Reiterating the policy that “[n]o defendant has a unilateral
125
right to set the time or circumstances under which he will be tried,”
the Second Circuit examined the circumstances of Santoro’s absence
126
and found that his waiver was both knowing and voluntary. The court
116. United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1972).
117. The phrase was used in Tortora. Id. at 1210; see infra note 134 and accompanying
text.
118. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210.
119. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 417–18 (2d Cir. 1995).
120. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1204–05.
121. Id. at 1206. Santoro later pled guilty to bail jumping. Id. at 1206 n.3. The trial was
deemed to have commenced before Santoro’s absence. Id. at 1206.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1207.
124. Id. at 1208. Tortora was, of course, decided before Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S.
255 (1993).
125. Tortora, 464 F.2d. at 1208.
126. Id. at 1209. When discussing such waiver, the court quoted Justice Brennan’s
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thus concluded that “there were no constitutional constraints against the
127
trial judge’s proceeding with the trial.” It added that the protections
128
of Rule 43 were similarly waived.
In addition to examining the constitutional question of waiver, the
court added a second inquiry that it deemed necessary in assessing a
trial court’s decision to proceed in the absence of the defendant:
It is obviously desirable that a defendant be present at his
own trial. We do not here lay down a general rule that, in every
case in which the defendant is voluntarily absent at the
empanelment of the jury and the taking of evidence, the trial
judge should proceed with the trial. We only hold that this is
within the discretion of the trial judge, to be utilized only in
circumstances as extraordinary as those before us. Indeed, we
would add that this discretion should be exercised only when the
public interest clearly outweighs that of the voluntarily absent
defendant. Whether the trial will proceed will depend upon the
trial judge’s determination of a complex of issues. He must
weigh the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the
defendant present; the difficulty of rescheduling, particularly in
multiple-defendant trials; the burden on the Government in
having to undertake two trials, again particularly in multipledefendant trials where the evidence against the defendants is
often overlapping and more than one trial might keep the
129
Government’s witnesses in substantial jeopardy.
In a footnote, the court noted, “It is difficult for us to conceive of
any case where the exercise of this discretion would be appropriate
130
other than a multiple-defendant case.”
Weighing these issues in determining whether the circumstances
were “extraordinary” enough to proceed, the Second Circuit found the
trial judge to have been “well within his discretion in refusing to adjourn

concurrence in Allen: “[T]here can be no doubt whatever that the governmental prerogative
to proceed with a trial may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial
from going forward.” Id. at 1209 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
127. Id. at 1209.
128. Id. at 1210 n.6. The court stated, “The rule is no more than a restatement of the
defendant’s constitutional rights.” Id.
129. Id. at 1210 (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 1210 n.7.
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131

the trial” or to sever Santoro’s case. The court also considered the fact
that numerous delays had already occurred due to the difficulty of
coordinating the attorney’s conflicting schedules and because of
defendants’ “unsubstantiated claims of physical ailments” resulting in
132
absences from trial.
It added that one witness had been threatened
and that the potential danger to that witness “would have continued
until that indefinite time in the future when [his] testimony in the second
133
trial would have been completed.”
The “complex of issues”
considered by the trial court thus supported the exercise of its discretion
134
to proceed in Santoro’s absence.
In 1995, in United States v. Nichols, the Second Circuit made it clear
that Tortora’s balancing analysis must include a sufficient assessment of
135
the public interest in proceeding under the circumstances of the case.
In that case, defendant Howard Mason had been convicted of federal
136
After
crimes relating to his ordering the death of a police officer.
having attended the proceedings for jury selection and only one day of
137
the trial. Mason refused to attend the remainder, wishing instead to
138
The trial court conducted a competency hearing,
return to his cell.
concluded that Mason was competent to stand trial, and proceeded in
139
his absence. On appeal, Mason argued that the court had not secured
140
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to be present. The Second
Circuit found that the trial court did not err in finding both the
defendant’s competency to stand trial and competency to waive his
141
constitutional right. It found Mason’s waiver of his right to be present
under both Rule 43 and the Constitution to be knowing and voluntary,
noting that “the district court took great pains . . . to inform Mason of
142
the benefits of attending trial.” The court continued:
On November 28, 1989, when Mason first declared his intention
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 417–18 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407–08.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 411, 416.
Id. at 417.
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to remain in his holding cell, Judge Korman even went down to
Mason’s cell to convince him to reconsider his decision. There,
he admonished Mason that a trial cannot stop just because a
defendant does not wish to participate. He emphasized that by
attending trial Mason could suggest questions to his lawyer for
cross-examination of witnesses cooperating with the government.
Judge Korman even indicated that, if at any time during trial
Mason needed time to confer with his lawyers about witness
cross-examination, the court would take a recess. . . . On
November 29, Judge Korman added that Mason’s lawyer was
doing a competent job attacking the government’s evidence,
implying that Mason’s aid might help tip the balance in his favor.
On that day, Judge Korman also conveyed to Mason that he had
a right to attend trial, stating that Mason was “entitled to the
143
opportunity to participate.”
Proceeding to Tortora’s balancing inquiry, the court noted that it
had since clarified that a trial court “has ‘broad discretion’ to proceed
144
with trial even in single-defendant cases.”
After reiterating the
specific issues to be considered under the language of Tortora, the court
stated that “a district court generally acts within its discretion if it
proceeds with trial when the defendant’s absence is a product of sheer
145
willfulness.”
The court also noted that “[w]hile there are
circumstances in which it would be impermissible for a court to proceed
146
with trial,” there is “usually sufficient justification to do so . . . if the
court finds the defendant to have engaged in ‘stonewalling and other
misconduct’ . . . or if ‘there is no reasonable likelihood that the trial
147
could soon proceed with the defendant present.’” Giving “due regard
148
to the circumstances of the waiver,” the court then observed that the
district court had viewed Mason as “defiant and uncooperative,” itself
adding that “Mason’s only explanation for his nonattendance was

143. Id.
144. Id. at 418.
145. Id.
146. Id. As an example, the court cited United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 37 (2d
Cir. 1989), which it characterized parenthetically as “holding it impermissible to proceed in a
single-defendant case where [the] court was informed that defendant’s absence because of
police detention would likely be brief.” Nichols, 56 F.3d at 418.
147. Nichols, 56 F.3d at 418 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 250–51 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
148. Id. at 418.
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indifference to and disdain for the proceedings.”
Consequently, it
found that the trial court’s decision to proceed was within its
150
discretion.
Tortora’s supervisory balancing-of-interests analysis has been
151
152
153
154
155
endorsed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and
156
157
Eleventh Circuits, and has been rejected by the Ninth. Contrary to
158
Nichols’s description of a trial court’s “broad discretion,” the Fifth
159
Circuit has emphasized the narrowness of the trial court’s discretion.
160
In United States v. Benavides, the Fifth Circuit’s most influential
opinion, the court stated that a trial judge “has ‘only a narrow
discretion’ in deciding whether to proceed with a trial when the
defendant is voluntarily in absentia because the right to be present at
161
one’s own trial must be carefully safeguarded.” This characterization
162
has been repeatedly reaffirmed in the Fifth Circuit. In Beltran-Nunez,
while agreeing with Tortora’s “cogent” enumeration of the issues to be
considered and expressly adding an assessment of the inconvenience to

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 857–58 (1st Cir. 1989) (adoption of Tortora).
152. United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988) (endorsing Tortora and its
footnote about multiple-defendant trials, but noting that an erroneous trial court decision
may be harmless).
153. See United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302–03 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying United
States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1979)); United States v. Krout, 56 F.3d 643, 646 n.5
(5th Cir. 1995) (inquiry on the record required); United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d
287, 290–91 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Benavides); Benavides, 596 F.2d at 139–40 (adoption of
Tortora).
154. United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 803–04 (8th Cir. 2005) (factual findings
required); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1996) (district court should
make a record inquiry to attempt to ascertain the explanation for absence).
155. United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 879 (10th Cir. 1991) (endorsement of Tortora
reiterating its footnote about multi-defendant trials), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2006).
156. United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1312–14 (11th Cir. 2001) (application of
Tortora and Nichols).
157. United States v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1991) (review limited to
factual finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily failed to appear).
158. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 418 (2d Cir. 1995).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139–40 (5th Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 137.
161. Id. at 139 (quoting Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1966)).
162. See United States v. Bone, 43 F.3d 669, 1994 WL 10119, at *5 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 1983).
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the court also observed,

Of course, had an inquiry before the trial proceeded
established for the record that the defendant had deliberately
absented himself and that there was no reasonable probability he
could be located shortly, we would be loath to say that the
district court would have abused its discretion by failing to delay
164
or reschedule the trial.
As in Nichols, the reasonable prospect that the defendant may soon
165
participate often weighs heavily in the balance.
In United States v.
166
Bradford, the Eleventh Circuit discussed Nichols and observed that
“[w]hether the district court’s discretion is characterized as broad or
narrow,” it agreed with the Second Circuit “that a defendant’s
obstructionist and willful behavior, and its effect on the orderly
administration of the court’s docket and the trial at hand, implicate a
167
compelling public interest.”
While parallels between the supervisory and prudential Tortora–
Nichols balancing test and Allen’s forfeiture-like analysis at times rise to
the surface in Court of Appeals’ consideration of the nature of the
public interest, the two inquiries are of course quite different. Judicial
characterizations of the Tortora–Nichols test emphasize the weight to be
afforded a defendant’s right to be present far more expressly than did
Allen, and require a particularized assessment of the interests involved.
Allen’s methodology nevertheless provided an influential backdrop
against which this independent supervisory analysis developed.
B. Consideration of Similar Approaches Among the States
Reaction to the federal balancing test among state courts has been
generally unreceptive. Among those states expressly considering its
adoption as a prudential constraint upon judicial discretion, a clear
majority has rejected it. Constitutional waiver analysis, inquiring as to
whether a defendant’s absence is voluntary, has remained the principal

163. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d at 290. Tortora’s list of issues did not purport to be
exhaustive, and the First Circuit has also expressly included a “co-defendant’s right to a
speedy trial.” See United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting United
States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 967–68 (1st Cir. 1982)).
164. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d at 291.
165. Id. at 290.
166. United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2001).
167. Id. at 1314.
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focus. For example, in State v. Thomson, the Supreme Court of
Washington considered the continuation of the drug trial of Thomson
168
and his codefendant after the former’s midtrial flight. The trial court
had predicated its decision to proceed upon Thomson’s voluntary
169
absence and its inability to locate him.
The Supreme Court of
Washington stated that, in contrast to Tortora’s balancing analysis,
Washington’s “voluntary waiver approach” governed a trial court’s
exercise of discretion in continuing the proceedings following a
170
defendant’s midtrial flight.
Under the voluntary waiver approach, the court only need
answer one question: whether the defendant’s absence is
voluntary. A voluntary absence operates as an implied waiver of
the right to be present. If the court finds a waiver of the right to
be present after trial has begun, the court is free to exercise its
171
discretion to continue the trial without further consideration.
The court emphasized the need for a sufficient inquiry and a
“preliminary finding of voluntariness,” as well as the requirement that a
defendant must be afforded “an adequate opportunity to explain his
172
absence” when he is in custody and before sentence is imposed.
As
Thomson’s absence remained unexplained, the trial court had not
173
abused its discretion. Decided before Nichols, Thomson noted that it
regarded the federal approach as permitting the continuation of trial
174
“only in extraordinary circumstances.”
Both before and after Nichols’ augmentation of Tortora, a significant
number of state courts have declined to require balancing because of
their view that its restraints upon judicial discretion are inappropriate or
even unauthorized. A recent case reaching the latter conclusion was
175
decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 2010.
In State v.
Finnegan, while observing that “the issue of whether [Minnesota] should

168. State v. Thomson, 872 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1994).
169. Id. Although the codefendant had expressed concern about a continuance because
his speedy trial date had expired, the court did not appear to regard this fact as significant in
its analysis. Id.
170. Id. at 1100–01.
171. Id. at 1100. Continuation of the trial is not required, however. Id. at 1101.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2010).
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adopt the federal balancing approach” was not before it, that court
nevertheless disagreed in detail with the dissent’s suggestion that it do
so, stating,
[W]e have addressed this issue before and have never directed
district courts to consider a second prong after they make a
determination that a defendant is voluntarily absent from trial.
The Second Circuit adopted its balancing approach only after
determining that the trial court had the discretion to decide
whether proceedings should be held even where the court had
determined the defendant was voluntarily absent. We have
never held that a district court is to address a second prong
involving a “complex of issues” after determining a defendant is
voluntarily absent from trial. Rather, under our precedent, a
determination that a defendant was voluntarily absent from trial
177
ends the analysis of whether the trial must continue.
Although Rule 26.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
178
Procedure was worded similarly to federal Rule 43, and the dissent
urged that the state rule be interpreted as affording a trial court similar
179
discretion as to whether to proceed, the court replied, “Regardless of
how federal courts have interpreted federal rules, our precedent gives
effect to the word ‘shall’” by mandating that a trial court continue after
180
its determination that a defendant “is voluntarily absent.”
The
181
182
183
Supreme Courts of New Jersey,
Pennsylvania,
Hawaii
and
176. Id. at 248 n.3.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. The version of Rule 26.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at
the time of Finnegan’s trial, according to Justice Meyer’s dissent in Finnegan, provided, in
pertinent part, for the following:
(2) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of a trial to and
including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be
considered to waive the right to be present whenever:
1. a defendant voluntarily and without justification absents himself or
herself after trial has commenced.
Id. at 258 n.1 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 258–59.
180. Id. at 248 n.3 (majority opinion).
181. See State v. Hudson, 574 A.2d 434, 442–43 (N.J. 1990) (voluntary and unjustified
absence permits proceeding with trial).
182. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 712 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1998). Wilson implicitly
declined to follow the Second Circuit’s approach, and the court noted that “even if we were to
adopt the Tortora test,” the defendant could not demonstrate that the trial should have been
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184

Connecticut, in considering and rejecting a balancing requirement,
have found a voluntary waiver inquiry to be adequate. Intermediate
185
186
appellate courts in Idaho and Texas have agreed.
In contrast, the high courts of New York, Delaware, and Maryland
have required balancing-of-interests analyses. In People v. Parker,
considering the matter under the federal and state constitutions, the
New York Court of Appeals initially concluded that there had been an
insufficient showing that the defendant’s rights had been knowingly,
187
voluntarily and intelligently waived. The court then added,
We consider it appropriate to emphasize that even after the
court has determined that a defendant has waived the right to be
present at trial by not appearing after being apprised of the right
and the consequences of nonappearance, trial in absentia is not
thereby automatically authorized. Rather, the trial court must
exercise its sound discretion upon consideration of all
appropriate factors, including the possibility that defendant
could be located within a reasonable period of time, the difficulty
delayed. Id. Wilson did agree, however, that the matters discussed in Tortora, while not
exhaustive, presented “reasonable and logical issues for a trial court to weigh.” Id.
183. See State v. Caraballo, 615 P.2d 91, 100 (Haw. 1980). In Caraballo, the court
adopted what it characterized as “the majority rule set out in Diaz,” stating that “where
defendant has voluntarily absented himself after the trial has begun, this operates as a waiver
of his right to be present and the trial may continue as if he were present.” Id. Caraballo
distinguished the court’s earlier use of the Tortora balancing test in State v. Okumura, 570
P.2d 848, 852 (Haw. 1977), on the ground that Okumura had not been absent voluntarily
because he required immediate medical treatment as the result of injuries incurred during an
attempt to escape from the courtroom. Caraballo, 615 P.2d at 100.
184. The disfavor with which a balancing requirement has been regarded by the
Supreme Court of Connecticut is reflected in its statement in State v. Durkin, that “we
previously have declined an invitation to adopt the Tortora test in this state” and “[t]he
defendant has offered no persuasive reason why the test should be embraced now.” State v.
Durkin, 595 A.2d 826, 832 n.10 (Conn. 1991). Durkin had involved a probation revocation
hearing, and the court cited State v. Drakeford. Id. (citing 519 A.2d 1194 (Conn. 1987)). In
Drakeford, the court had found Tortora’s balancing to be inappropriate when the criminal
defendant had been present in the courtroom at the time that he elected to leave. See id. at
1198.
185. See State v. Elliott, 882 P.2d 978, 983 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (expressing a
preference for Washington’s analysis in State v. Thomson).
186. See Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (stating that
analysis of Benavides is not required with regard to trial court’s exercise of discretion).
187. People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 1316 (N.Y. 1982). Charged with the sale of
drugs, the defendant had failed to appear before trial began. Id. at 1314. The court stated
that “the record . . . is devoid of any evidence indicating that defendant was ever apprised or
otherwise aware that her trial would proceed in her absence.” Id. at 1316.

11 SHAPIRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/6/2013 9:34 PM

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

617

of rescheduling trial and the chance that evidence will be lost or
witnesses will disappear. In most cases the simple expedient of
adjournment pending execution of a bench warrant could
provide an alternative to trial in absentia unless, of course, the
prosecution can demonstrate that such a course of action would
188
be totally futile.
189

In Bradshaw v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware followed a
similar approach after noting that there was insufficient evidence of
190
waiver during the defendant’s absence when his unauthorized counsel
191
agreed to permit the court to give an Allen charge and when the
192
charge was given. Observing that Rule 43 of the Delaware Superior
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure “was modeled after Federal Rule of
193
Criminal Procedure 43, so precedent regarding that rule is germane,”
the court added,
[W]e cannot say that Bradshaw’s absence prevented “[t]he
further progress of the trial. . . .”
When a defendant is
voluntarily absent, federal courts have considered a list of factors
in determining whether the trial should proceed without a
defendant, including “the likelihood that the trial could soon
take place with the defendant present; the difficulty of
rescheduling; . . . [and] the burden on the Government.” There
was no evidence that the trial judge or counsel on either side
194
even touched upon these commonsense considerations.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly required a
195
balancing of the interests of the defendant and the state, while
188. Id. at 1317 (citation omitted).
189. Bradshaw v. State, 806 A.2d 131 (Del. 2002).
190. Id. at 136. The court addressed the issue of waiver solely under Delaware’s rules.
Id. at 134.
191. Id. Allen v. United States permits a supplemental charge encouraging a deadlocked
jury to arrive at a verdict. See 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
192. Bradshaw, 806 A.2d at 134.
193. Id. at 135 (footnote omitted).
194. Id. at 136 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210
(2d Cir. 1972)).
195. See Collins v. State, 829 A.2d 992, 1001–03 (Md. 2003) (noting that trial court’s
discretion to proceed was properly exercised when it “had no idea when [defendant] would
become available and expressed concern that jury’s term might expire”); Pinkney v. State, 711
A.2d 205, 216–17 (Md. 1998) (noting that both the trial court’s waiver inquiry and its
consideration of respective interests were inadequate); see also State v. Clements, 765 P.2d
1195, 1201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (endorsing balancing).
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“declin[ing] to mandate any particular list” of factors to be considered.
The mixed reaction to the imposition of a prudential balancing-ofinterests approach underscores the constitutional ability of state and
federal courts to forego any inquiry beyond that of a defendant’s waiver,
197
and to proceed to trial in his or her absence. A question remains as to
whether this constitutional state of affairs provides a standard that is
commensurate with the critical importance of the right to be present.
IV. REFINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
While it is evident that courts have implemented a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to be present by assessing its
relinquishment as a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver, the issue
of the voluntariness of a defendant’s absence has thus often occupied
center stage. Conspicuously absent from these constitutional analyses
has been the need for any inquiry as to when a defendant’s presence
198
might be secured.
Courts have seemingly been comfortable with
199
Tortora–
consigning the issue to the discretion of the trial court.
Nichols’ prudential balancing does provide some framework for those
courts employing it. As for the constitutional standard, however, the
Washington Supreme Court’s articulation of its “voluntary waiver”
approach is generally descriptive: “If the court finds a waiver of the right
to be present after trial has begun, the court is free to exercise its
200
discretion to continue the trial without further consideration.”
The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach, actually foreclosing judicial
201
inquiry beyond the question of voluntariness, remains unusual.
Its
analysis does, however, highlight the absence of a perception of any
constitutional need for the use of judicial discretion in addressing such
matters as a defendant’s availability.
Perhaps the widely-used waiver standard is now as it should be. We
are, after all, quite comfortable with traditional constitutional waiver
analysis, and, as there does not appear to be a trend towards
Minnesota’s view, we are also quite comfortable with the exercise of
judicial discretion. A defendant’s voluntary, knowing and intelligent

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Collins, 829 A.2d at 1003.
See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
State v. Thomson, 872 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Wash. 1994).
State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243, 248 n.3 (Minn. 2010).
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absence from the carefully constructed legal process that society has
developed to afford fairness might, in fact, provide an appropriate
beginning and end to the constitutional inquiry.
This might be an appropriate perspective if the presence of the
defendant at a criminal trial were a characteristic of our criminal justice
system that accrued to the benefit of the defendant alone. That view of
a defendant’s right to be present is, however, clearly at odds with
widely-acknowledged properties of the right. There are reasons why a
criminal trial in absentia is so jarring to American sensibilities. The
constitutional status of a defendant’s right to be present furthers basic
and profound societal values. These interests demand a more searching
standard for the relinquishment of the right than a waiver analysis alone.
The task of refining a standard is also made more difficult by the need to
acknowledge at the outset that the implicated values of society are
multifaceted. Society’s interests in affording a criminal defendant a
right to be present are of course accompanied by the imperative that
202
justice be administered in an appropriate and orderly manner.
The
challenge of refining the constitutional standard for assessing a
relinquishment of the right is the challenge of adequately
accommodating both interests.
Common law discussion of the right to be present at trial appears to
have focused primarily upon the benefits that the right provided to the
defendant. For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 1851
203
204
observation in Prine v. Commonwealth, quoted in Crosby, that the
defendants’ presence “inclin[ed] the hearts of the jurors to listen to his
205
defence with indulgence,” was supplemented by observations that the
personalization of the process afforded by a defendant’s presence
required that he or she be available to discuss questions of law and
206
207
fact, to “point out and argue objections to the actions of the jury,” to
208
209
be heard,
to confront accusers,
to hear and observe jury

202. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
203. Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103 (1851).
204. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
205. Prine, 18 Pa. at 104.
206. See State v. Hughes, 2 Ala. 102, 104 (1841) (Alabama Constitution was “affirmatory
of the common law”).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
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211

instructions,
and to poll the jury.
Broad Supreme Court
characterizations of the significance to the defendant of the
constitutional right to be present have ranged from the Court’s
description in Allen of the right to be present as “[o]ne of the most basic
212
of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause” to its statement
in Diaz that “[i]n cases of felony our courts, with substantial accord,
have regarded it . . . as being scarcely less important to the accused than
213
the right of trial itself.”
Extending well beyond the fundamental ability of a defendant to
avail him or herself of the attributes of the trial process, two societal
values served by a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to be present
stand out most prominently. Most significant are society’s interest “in
an accurate determination of guilt” and society’s need for “public
214
confidence in the judiciary as an instrument of justice.”
These
characterizations of the State’s interests were set forth by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in quite a different context, when it considered the
factors to be weighed in the implementation of a prudential Tortora
215
analysis.
They aptly describe the societal values served by the
216
constitutional right itself. The right to defend, personal in nature and
so obviously furthered by the defendant’s presence, ultimately serves
217
the critical ability of our adversarial system to determine truth. While
the determination of the defendant’s culpability of course remains
central, the authors of one commentary have added that a trial’s
ascertaining of the truth also serves other societal goals, such as the
identification and condemnation of wrongs that “should attract a public,
218
formal response.”
The value of public confidence in the fairness of

210. See O’Connor v. Guthrie & Jordan, 11 Iowa 80, 80 (1860).
211. See People v. Perkins, 1 Wend. 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828). See generally 1 JOSEPH
CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 635–36 (1847) (“[V]erdict . . .
must, in all cases of felony and treason be delivered in the presence of the defendant, in open
court, and cannot be either privily given, or promulgated while he is absent . . . .”).
212. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
213. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912).
214. Pinkney v. State, 711 A.2d 205, 214 (Md. 1998).
215. See id. at 227.
216. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975).
217. For a view of “the significance of truth as the goal of the [criminal] trial” see 3
ANTHONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 79 (2007).
218. Id. at 82.
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this process also continues to be of perennial importance.
These
values are inadequately served by a bare inquiry into whether a
defendant, as an individual, has voluntarily waived his right to be
present. At a minimum, in addition to weighing the reasons for a
defendant’s absence, an examination of the possibility of expeditiously
securing his presence is warranted.
While there is an evident need for a more refined constitutional
standard for relinquishment, any suggested approach must afford a
sufficiently clear framework for its implementation. The unstructured
nature of the Tortora–Nichols “complex of issues” inquiry makes it
unsuited for wholesale incorporation into a constitutional test. It is
nevertheless possible to suggest a process for assessing the constitutional
validity of a relinquishment, which is sufficiently structured and which
takes into account important considerations highlighted by the Tortora–
Nichols discussion. A trial court’s consideration should of course begin
with waiver analysis, and a focus on the voluntariness of a defendant’s
absence should continue to be its cornerstone. If the standards for
waiver are satisfied, the court should be required to proceed to the
question of whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant’s
presence can be secured. Some of the facts addressed during the waiver
inquiry might well bear upon this issue. It is also possible that the
prosecutor can demonstrate that there is no reasonable possibility that
defendant’s presence might be obtained. If this is the case, the
constitutional standard for the relinquishment of the right should be
deemed to be satisfied, and the trial court should be free to exercise its
discretion as to whether to proceed in absentia. Such judicial discretion
on the matter would remain undisturbed by any refinement of the
constitutional standard.
It is of course probable that this inquiry into the feasibility of
securing a defendant’s presence would yield little information, and that
the issuance of a bench warrant or another less formal procedure would
be appropriate. Unless the prosecution can demonstrate its futility (as
220
outlined above), or can demonstrate the presence of a compelling
219. A 1998 study by the American Bar Association revealed overall confidence in the
American criminal justice system to be surprisingly low. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 49–50 (1999). Another has observed that
perceptions of procedural fairness weigh heavily in the formulation of public confidence in
state courts. See Sara C. Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts, 68 J.
POL. 697, 699, 703–04 (2006).
220. People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (N.Y. 1982).
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need (as discussed below), the process of attempting to secure a
defendant’s presence should also be a prerequisite to affording a court
the constitutional authority to proceed in absentia.
Recognition of limitations upon the effectiveness of bench warrants
also compels the conclusion that this should not be an open-ended
process. A period of forty-eight hours would seem to be sufficient in
order to determine whether a bench warrant or other measure is
productive, and if the defendant is not present within that time a court
should be free to exercise its discretion in deciding to proceed without
him. It is also evident from the Tortora–Nichols discussion that there
may be unusual compelling circumstances in which the needs of the
prosecution should permit proceeding in absentia without the delay
occasioned by the process of attempting to secure a defendant’s
presence. An example would be a situation in which a witness is in
danger. Such compelling needs would be rare and best determined on a
case-specific basis. This process, as well as the court’s affording the
prosecution an initial opportunity to demonstrate that a defendant’s
presence cannot reasonably be obtained, provides a flexibility that
should satisfy critics who would argue that this suggested approach is
unworkable.
The principal characteristic of this suggested constitutional approach
is to move beyond the current waiver and voluntariness analyses, which
inquire into the reason for the defendant’s absence, and require that
attention be paid to the actual prospect of securing his appearance. A
shift in this direction, making adequate accommodation for the need to
proceed with the orderly administration of justice, is clearly needed if all
of the values embodied in the right to be present are to be adequately
served. While the current employment of a voluntary waiver analysis
does present a seductive symmetry when compared with the standards
for relinquishment of many other constitutional rights, a court’s choice
to proceed with a trial in absentia truly does present the singular
considerations highlighted above. If the Supreme Court’s previous
characterizations of the importance of the right to be present have
significance, and if the reliability and fairness of our adversarial system
are to be adequately furthered, a modification of the currently prevalent
constitutional relinquishment analysis would be both appropriate and
feasible.

221. State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243, 258–59 (Minn. 2010).

